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A Vernacular Republican Rhetoric:
William Manning’s Key of Libberty
Jennifer R. Mercieca & James Arnt Aune
Our analysis of farmer and tavern-keeper William Manning’s 1798 Key of Libberty
extends the concept of American republican rhetoric to include both elite and vernacular
forms. We find that the key components of Manning’s vernacular republicanism are: an
aggressive use of the rhetoric of critique; the demand for transparency in public
argument; the rejection of elite leadership; and the belief that decisions must be made in
the interest of the common good. We compare vernacular to elite republicanism and
conclude that the vernacular perspective has endured in American reform rhetoric.
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Key of Libberty
In a free government the few, finding their schemes & vues of interest borne down
by the many, to gain the power they cant constitutionally obtain, Always indevour
to git it by cunning & corruption, contious at the same time that usurpation when
once began the safty of the userper consists ondly in grasping the hole. To efect this
no cost nor pains is spared, but they first unite their plans & schemes by
asotiations, conventions, & coraspondances with each other. The Merchants
asotiate by themselves, the Phitisians by themselves, the Ministers by themselves,
the Juditial & Executive Officers are by their professions often called together &
know each others minds, & all letirary men & the over grown rich, that can live
without labouring, can spare time for consultation. All being bound together by
common interest, which is the strongest bond of union, join in their secret
corraspondance to counter act the interests of the many & pick their pockets, which
is efected ondly for want of the meens of knowledge amounge them.1
Billerica, Massachusetts farmer and tavern-keeper William Manning believed that the
republicanism of the Revolution had been hijacked by a cabal of elites who, because
of their ‘‘common interest,’’ conspired to rob the rightful rulers of the nation of their
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fair share of power. In the Key of Libberty, a manifesto written shortly after the House
of Representatives agreed to fund ‘‘the monster’’ known as Jay’s Treaty, he poured out
his frustrations with the ruling elite and called on his fellow sufferers to unite to
reclaim the government. His extended essay is noteworthy in the context of early
American history because he clearly demonstrates the rift between the promise of a
republicanism in which the people held power and the reality of a republicanism in
which the people held very little power. While the duality of appearance versus reality
was plain to Manning, the question on his mind was how to temper the ‘‘cunning &
corruption’’ of the elite in a ‘‘free government’’ where the few have power and the
many have the duty to stem the tide of such corruption. His answer was that while it
was natural for ‘‘common interest’’ to bind the few, the many had not realized that
they also shared a common interest that was distinct from the few. He believed that if
the many would associate and educate themselves, then the corruption of the elite
would end. Manning thus imagined himself to be duty-bound to expose the elite’s
machinations of power and to motivate the many to associate, educate themselves,
and save the republic.
We take Manning’s essay to be representative of what can be called a ‘‘vernacular
republicanism,’’ or, a republicanism that views the few as corrupt and the many as the
rightful rulers of the government.2 Manning earnestly believed that the many should
hold political power, and his essay is thus also noteworthy as an embodiment of
vernacular republican rhetoric. In other words, Manning drew from a republican
rhetorical tradition that is distinctly egalitarian and used the topoi of that tradition to
advance his arguments. By calling Manning’s rhetoric ‘‘vernacular republicanism’’ we
mean to suggest both that republicanism can be vernacular in Benedict Anderson’s use
of the term as the existing indigenous languages or dialects that people use in specific
locations, or as he calls it ‘‘the warp and woof of their lives,’’ and a view of
republicanism that political taxonomists would recognize as direct participatory
democracy. Our discussion of Manning’s essay is meant to demonstrate the existence
of this form of republicanism and to delineate some of the important features of its
rhetorical embodiment. It will become readily apparent to students of republican
rhetoric that Manning’s essay shares little in common with Cicero’s ‘‘republican style’’
described by Robert Hariman or Thomas Jefferson’s ‘‘felicitous republicanism’’
described by Stephen Browne. Manning’s essay is not the eloquent treatise that one
would expect in the high republican style, but what Manning lacks in refinement he
makes up for in earnestness and emotion. Manning’s vernacular republicanism is
based upon the fear of corruption and is motivated by the common good just like
‘‘elite republicanism,’’ but whereas elite republicanism found corruption in the
tyranny of monarchy, vernacular republicanism extends the locus of corruption to the
tyranny of the elite in all of their forms, be they monarchs, aristocrats, or the monied
class.
Michael P. Kramer writes that after the Revolution:
Americans realized that their experiment in self-government put an extraordinary
burden upon public opinion and, hence, upon the dissemination of information
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and political debate; and discourses on language*/whose subject is, in these terms,
the very foundation of the American polity*/are rich repositories of nationalist
hopes and fears.3
Manning was keenly aware of the role of public opinion in the American republican
experiment; indeed, his goal in the Key is to create a new consensus among laborers
and to rally them to take a more active part in forming and communicating their
opinions. The great controversies of the 1790s*/over the Bank, Jay’s Treaty, the Alien
and Sedition Acts, and the French Revolution*/were, Thomas Gustafson writes, a
‘‘Thucydidean moment,’’ where a republic confronts the reality that political and
linguistic disorders are one and the same: ‘‘when fortune or necessity or corruption
defeats virtue, or when moral and political stability*/and the code of language that
sustains that stability*/collapses into confusion and the muteness of violence.’’4
Manning’s solution for the Thucydidean crisis of the republic was for the many to
improve their own organization, communication, and education. He believed that
the republic could be saved from the corruption of the elite if a national society of
laborers was founded and a monthly magazine of political education was made
cheaply available to all.
Although Manning has been treated as a proto-Marxist because of his call for a
society of laborers, it makes more sense to read him as an example of how a
vernacular republican style developed alongside more elite forms. He provided an
essentially communicative definition of class power, a democratic alternative to
classical eloquence, and a political theory that relies more on equal access to the
means of communication than to the means of production. Demonstrating that he
was not aware of his own rhetoricity Manning distrusted political elites in part
because they used ‘‘all the arts & retrick Hell can invent’’ to deceive the many. Thus,
Manning himself has suggested an interpretation of his text: there are two kinds of
republican rhetorics, one that is trickery and one that is transparent. Like the elites of
his era Manning rehashes ‘‘the causes that ruen republicks’’ in considerable detail, yet
Manning diverged from an elite republican view of corruption by blaming the
problem of corruption on the merchants, physicians, ministers, writers, and especially
lawyers who organize themselves efficiently; who restrict access to useful information;
and who conduct public argument in artfully misleading ways.5
We believe that Manning’s Key of Libberty is interesting both as an example of the
use of vernacular republican rhetoric and for how he envisions the ideal American
republican political community. With this analysis we hope to broaden the
conception of republican rhetoric to include both elite and vernacular forms. We
believe that it is necessary to broaden our conception of republican rhetoric for two
main reasons. First, our current understanding is one-dimensional, and therefore
necessarily incomplete. Second, we believe that the language of criticism embodied in
the vernacular republican form remains a prominent feature of American political
discourse, and therefore requires further study. We proceed first by briefly discussing
the circumstances of the composition and recovery of Manning’s work. Next, we
describe Manning’s response to the political controversies of the 1790s. Finally, we
delineate the main features of Manning’s vernacular republican public sphere. From
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this analysis it becomes clear that Manning believed that while elites were battling for
political power during the age of Federalism, he and the rest of the many were
relegated to the margins of political debate and forced into the position of helpless
spectators.
Composing the Key of Libberty
Manning submitted his treatise in April 1798 to Thomas Adams, editor of the Boston
Independent Chronicle , the only republican newspaper in the area. It was not an
auspicious time for submitting the manuscript. The XYZ Affair occurred in the same
month, resulting in an explosion of popular support for Federalist policy towards
France, and culminating in a quasi-war as well as the Alien and Sedition Acts.
Thomas Adams and his brother Abijah were arraigned for seditious libel. Thomas
died before his trial, and Abijah served 30 days in jail. The manuscript of the Key was
returned unread. A year later Manning tried again, shortening the treatise, adding
some religious and moral arguments, and toning down attacks on George
Washington. It is unclear what Abijah Adams did then, since no correspondence
survives, but the Key was never printed in the Chronicle or elsewhere until 1922.6 It is
unlikely that the paper would have printed the Key anyway. As Samuel Eliot Morison
points out, it was hardly in the paper’s interest to encourage the publication of a
much cheaper monthly magazine.7 Further, it is unlikely that the editor was able to
make it past Manning’s spelling.8 Finally, it appears that the press of the time was
moving away from longer, reflective essays toward what we would recognize as
‘‘news’’ stories and entertaining features.9
The 1798 version of the Key was privately printed in 1922 by the Manning Family
Association, which had retained Manning’s papers. The young Harvard historian
Samuel Eliot Morison provided a brief introduction and some notes, as well as
adding some punctuation and paragraphing to make the text more readable. This
edition was reprinted in William and Mary Quarterly in 1956. For the convenience of
readers, we will use the William and Mary Quarterly version, since it is more widely
accessible than the 1922 book. Morison found in the Key ‘‘a lonely American whisper
of Karl Marx’s cry, ‘Workers of the World, Unite!’’’10 The first extended discussions of
Manning appeared in two radical newspapers of the 1920s, The Call and The
Freeman .11 Subsequent references to the Key reveal the shifting paradigms of
American historical scholarship. Eugene Link in 1942 praised the work and analyzed
it in the larger context of the Democratic-Republican societies of the 1790s.12 Merle
Curti made a brief reference to its ‘‘crude but vigorous idiom’’ in his Growth of
American Thought .13 A counter-Progressive reading was provided by Richard
Hofstadter in Anti-Intellectualism in American Life , where he saw Manning as
representative of the ‘‘primitivist and anti-intellectualist populism’’ that took over
popular parties at the beginning of the 19th century. He claimed that ‘‘to Manning
learning and knowledge were of interest mainly as class weapons.’’14
More recent discussion of Manning follows the growth of social history since the
1960s, with its concern for writing history ‘‘from the bottom up.’’ The critical legal
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studies theorist Christopher Tomlins uses the Key as the opening anecdote of his
history of labor law in the United States, claiming that Manning had forged ‘‘a
republican language that was also a language of class.’’15 In 1993 the radical labor
historians Michael Merrill and Sean Wilentz published the 1799 version of the Key
with an extensive introduction and notes (Harvard University Press: the choice of
publisher would no doubt have shocked William Manning). Merrill and Wilentz’s
edition is a remarkable scholarly achievement; they have ferreted out what must be
every available bit of information about Manning’s life, down to the fact that his
house in Billerica is now a Szechuan restaurant.16 Merrill and Wilentz are clearly
enthusiastic about Manning, and view their project as part of the larger attempt to
recover what they call ‘‘the plebeian intellectual life of the early Republic.’’ Edmund S.
Morgan, in his review of their book, argues that Merrill and Wilentz are responding
to the urgent need of the American left to ‘‘discover native non-Marxian roots’’ after
the collapse of Communism, and sees little to value in Manning other than the
entertainment provided by his conspiracy theory about the Society of the
Cincinnati.17 Our analysis of Manning thus builds on and diverges from these
former accounts. Rather than reducing Manning’s arguments to ‘‘entertainment’’ or
‘‘proto-Marxism,’’ we believe that a careful reading of the Key reveals the tension
between the promise of a republicanism resting on the will of the people and the
reality of a republicanism controlled by the elite. Reconstructing the Thucydidean
crises of the 1790s from Manning’s perspective allows us to view these events as he
did*/as evidence of an elite cabal. It was this elite cabal that motivated him to write
the Key.
Beginning of Party Politics, Hamilton’s Economics, and Jay’s Treaty
It is difficult to know exactly where one should begin when describing the origins of
the political animosities between Alexander Hamilton’s Federalists and Thomas
Jefferson’s Republicans. Any narrative describing the brewing hostilities of America’s
first political parties would seem reductive and simplistically linear. William Manning
viewed the events of the 1790s and the attendant elite debates over public policy with
such simplistic linearity; he saw the political world that unfolded before him as
portentous of a slippery slope to despotism. Not only was the nation heading for
‘‘ruen,’’ but also it was abundantly clear to Manning that while the Federalists and the
Republicans debated the important questions of the day, common folks like him were
excluded from the conversation. The vernacular republican perspective found in the
Key allows Manning to critique the elite’s machinations of power and to encourage
the many to save the republic from corruption. We therefore gain both insight into
how Manning viewed the political questions of the 1790s and an example of the
vernacular republican language of critique by listening closely to Manning’s
arguments.
In 1789 Americans experienced a brief moment of hopeful perceived political
unanimity when then Federalist James Madison acquiesced to Anti-Federalist
concerns and proposed what became the Bill of Rights to the First Congress.18
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Unfortunately, the utopian moment of party unanimity could not be sustained in the
face of real political differences and philosophical interpretations of American
republican political theory.19 The American economy was in dire straits and Treasury
Secretary Hamilton’s proposals*/assumption of state debts, funding, and the first
National Bank*/smacked of an attempt to create a British capitalist empire to many
of those who had been Anti-Federalists during ratification. The old Antis coalesced
around their distrust of Hamilton and his policies and became the Republican
opposition party. Madison, like most Southerners, found himself more sympathetic
with the Republican vision of an agrarian, middling economy, and became a
regrettable loss to the Federalist cause.20 Hamilton was able to use the Federalist
majority to get his economic plans passed, but the seeds of bitter discontent were
planted and what was initially merely opposition became an internal war between
what Republicans argued was the party of the people versus the party of the elite; the
party of France versus the party of Britain; and the party of the agrarian interests
versus the party of the capitalist interests. Republicans like Thomas Jefferson were
able to present a vision of republicanism to the masses that ambiguously promised
more democratic control of the government. Such arguments may have resonated
with William Manning because he sided with the Republican perspective over the
Federalist majority. The Society of Cincinnati, Hamilton’s economic policies, the
military suppression of the 1794 Whiskey Rebellion, and the final straw, the
ratification of Jay’s Treaty with Britain, were all evidence of
the unweryed pains & the unjustifiable measures taken by large numbers of all
orders of men who git a living without labour in Elections & many other things to
ingure the interests of the Labourer & deprive us of the priviledges of a free
government.21
We believe that Manning identified with the Republican Party because he agreed
with their rhetoric of opposition and critique, although it is clear in retrospect that
the Republicans did not wish to share political power with the many any more than
the Federalist did.22 We will briefly review each of these controversies and Manning’s
reaction to them in order to describe the exigency that he felt when composing his
Key of Libberty.
The Society of Cincinnati
While late 18th-century America was nominally egalitarian, as Gordon Wood has
noted, a sense of hierarchical entitlement lingered in the minds of many of the
country’s elite. According to Wood the Revolution confused many of the traditional
relationships between the many and the few:
Everywhere ordinary people were no longer willing to play their accustomed roles
in the hierarchy, no longer willing to follow their callings, no longer willing to
restrict their consumption of goods. They were less dependent, less willing to walk
while gentleman rode, less willing to doff their caps, less deferential, less passive,
less respectful of those above them.23
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One way in which the few had previously displayed their superiority was through
accepting officer commissions during the French/Indian War (which introduced
George Washington to Americans) and the American Revolution. It was quite
common for retired officers to use their rank for the rest of their lives. For example,
people referred to Aaron Burr as Colonel Burr even while he was the Vice-President;
in a classless society like America such titles amounted to an American version of an
aristocracy. Such was the complaint anyway when at the close of the Revolution
American officers formed the Society of Cincinnati. While the Society was named
after the Roman legend of Cincinnatus, who was ‘‘called from his plow to rescue
Rome, and return[ed] to his plow when danger had passed,’’ Manning viewed the
Society of Cincinnati as part of an aristocratic plot to prevent hard-working average
citizens from exercising their fair share of political power.24 Manning demonstrated
his vernacular understanding of republicanism by devoting several pages to
demonstrating exactly how the Society had exploited its position, and how average
people could take the country back from ‘‘this ordir.’’25 Manning was not alone in his
criticism. For example, on February 8, 1787 a group calling itself ‘‘Massachusetts
Soldiery’’ condemned the Society for using the legend of the Roman hero to further
their own, less heroic ends:
[W]hy do these officers assume the appellation of Cincinnati, without imitating the
virtues of their patron? . . . Do they, like Cincinnatus, cheerfully return to tread
those humble paths, in which they patiently walked before the war, the occupation
of mechanicks and the pursuits of husbandry? Did he claim the favour of his
country, and wish to be the sole master of the labour of that people, and the
property of that country, which he fondly imagined he had saved?26
Manning agreed with this critique of the Society as a cabal of elites without virtue
who made claims to the ‘‘favour’’ of the country.
The Society was made up of officers serving at the end of the Revolution, ‘‘or those
who had served for three years at the end of the Revolution, or those who had served
for three years at the officer level, and their direct male descendants.’’27 It was the
hereditary character of membership that worried many Americans, and not just
Morison’s ‘‘plain folk.’’ John Adams wrote to Lafayette in 1784 that the Society was
‘‘the first step taken to defame the beauty of our temple of Liberty.’’28 A pamphlet by
Aedanus Burke, under the name of ‘‘Cassius,’’ entitled ‘‘Considerations on the Order
or Society of Cincinnati’’ was widely circulated and Manning’s beloved Independent
Chronicle published extracts in 1784. Town meetings throughout Massachusetts
passed resolutions condemning pensions granted to members by Congress in 1783
(members were to receive five years’ full pay in government securities bearing
6% interest).
The General Court protested as well, and on March 22, 1784 the Massachusetts
legislature adopted a resolution condemning the Society.29 George Washington was
so concerned about the public image of the Society that he asked for Thomas
Jefferson’s advice. Jefferson hated the Society, but encouraged Washington to ask
them to change the hereditary aspect of membership. The national proposal to
eliminate hereditary membership, adopted in 1786, defused some of the opposition,
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although the Massachusetts chapter, which was the largest (some 300 members),
reversed itself in 1788.30
The name of the Society must have seemed a characteristic sort of ‘‘aristocraticle’’
trickery to our labourer, who had actually touched a plow. He cast doubt on the
honesty of the Society’s alteration of its constitution and its public defense of itself,
since immediately afterwards ‘‘their was a continual noys & wrighting from one end of
the Continent to the other against the badness of publick credit, & the weekness &
insefitiancy of the Federal Government.’’31 The next sentence seems to imply that the
Society actually fomented Shays’ Rebellion in order to have an excuse to suppress it:
‘‘When the Shais affair happened in Massachusetts it was heded by one of this ordir &
many of the rest of them put under pay to suppress it.’’ It is true that two members
took part in the Rebellion, but they were expelled from the Society afterwards.
Further, Manning believed that the Society had attempted to ‘‘establish a monorcal
government in ordir to have their president [George Washington] made king,’’ but
had failed at the Constitutional Convention. Still, they ‘‘rigeled themselves into almost
all the posts of profit & honour in the federal Government,’’ and proceeded to create
the funding and assumption system, start the Indian War, and make the Jay Treaty.32
At first sight, this appears to be yet another instance of Hofstadter’s ‘‘paranoid
style,’’ but by the standards of the day it was actually rather a mild critique (compare
the High Federalists’ considerably more elaborate Illuminati conspiracy).33
Manning’s criticism of the Society is of specific interest to our argument; his
understanding of republicanism is distinctly vernacular because he argued that the
Society was the planner and leader of other organizations of the few.34 He lists a
number of ‘‘ordirs of the few’’ who use government in their own interests, including
‘‘speculators, Stock & Land Jobers,’’ ‘‘Doctors,’’ ‘‘Marchants,’’ ‘‘Literary Men and
Coledges,’’ and especially lawyers who:
have established their Bar Meetings & become the most formidable & influential
ordir of any in the Government, & though they are nither Juditial nor Executive
officers, but a kind of Mule ordir, engendered by, & many times overawing both.
This ordir of men git their living intirely from the quarrils follyes disputes &
destreses of the Many & the intricacy of our Laws.35
The fact that this ‘‘ordir of men’’ earns its living ‘‘intirely from the quarrils follyes
disputes & destreses of the Many & the intricacy of our Laws’’ suggests that the many
viewed the political crises of the 1790s as the result of the tricky elite republican
rhetoric of the few. As Manning argued, without a free press and more transparency
in legal and political rhetoric, the many will continue to be oppressed. This version of
republicanism is distinctly different from more elite forms, which would have argued
that these orders of men were precisely the right rulers of the government. By labeling
the elite as leaders of a cabal Manning reverses the assumptions of elite republican
order and demonstrates that elites are just as corrupt as monarchs. This is of specific
importance to vernacular republican rhetoric because the only solution to this form
of corruption is for the many to seize power from the elites and save the republic
from corruption.
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Hamilton’s Economic Program
The first great controversy of the newly created United States of America centered on
Alexander Hamilton’s economic program. For many Federalists the primary reason
for supporting the new Constitution had been the hope that through the federal
system American credit abroad could be rescued from its near bankrupt state, ending
the financial depression that had begun in 1785. Thus, Federalists were generally
supportive of Hamilton’s plan. However, some of the old Federalists and Anti-
Federalists were still skeptical of federal concentration of power and upon Hamilton’s
September 11, 1789 nomination as Secretary of Treasury, James Madison argued that
the Treasury should not be run on the British model of a single, supremely powerful
and odious officer, but by a more democratic board of officers. Federalist Fisher Ames
reminded such skeptics that the state of America’s finances ‘‘presents to the
imagination a deep, dark, and dreary chaos; impossible to be reduced to order
without the mind of the architect is clear and capacious, and his power
commensurate to the occasion; he must not be the flitting creature of a day.’’36
Madison’s side of the argument lost and Hamilton was confirmed as the Secretary of
the Treasury on the same day as his nomination.
Hamilton’s plan was controversial for several reasons. First, many Americans
distrusted Hamilton and therefore did not want to grant him so much power over the
new nation. Second, many Americans wanted the economy to remain agrarian, rather
than capitalist. And third, Hamilton’s programs seemed to be the means of
consolidating federal power for dangerous ends.37 Hamilton believed that the
American economy required a standing debt (the higher the better, he reasoned),
freely circulating currency, and the prompt payment of foreign loans. His Federalists
friends and predecessors from the Confederation Finance Department, Robert Morris
and his assistant, the Constitutional stylist Gouverneur Morris (no relation), agreed
with Hamilton’s plan, as did most of the Federalists who voted it into effect. For
example, President Washington was so pleased with the House’s approbation of
Hamilton’s system that he included mention of it in his January 8, 1790 message to
Congress:
I saw with peculiar pleasure, at the close of the last session, the resolution entered
into by you, expressive of your opinion that an adequate provision for the support
of the public credit, is a matter of high importance to the national honor and
prosperity. In this sentiment I entirely concur.38
Specifically, the Hamiltonian finance plan required three controversial maneuvers:
first, the assumption by the federal government of state debts contracted through the
Revolution and a new federal loan to pay off all such debt; second, new taxes on
wines, spirits, teas, and coffees and a more stringent collection of customs duties to
pay down the big debt that the federal government was to assume; and third, the
creation of the Bank of the United States. Support for Hamilton’s measures came
mostly from the merchants, manufacturers, and shipping industries of the northeast,
from southerners whose states had not paid off their revolutionary debts, and from
those who had personally bought up large shares of old depreciated notes and who
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now stood to make a great profit on the federal government’s plan to pay back
current holders of these state and Confederation notes at face value. Opposition to
Hamilton’s plan came from strict Constitutional constructionists who did not agree
with Hamilton that Congress had implied powers to effect his system, from
representatives from states that had paid off their Revolutionary debt and did not
think that they should now be punished by paying for the debt of others, from
representatives who found Hamilton’s proposal to pay current note holders instead of
the original holders (and patriotic Revolutionary War soldiers and supporters)
unjust, and from those who feared that the whole plan seemed a little too British and
capitalist for their view of American republicanism. In the end Hamilton’s plan
passed as proposed with a little help from Madison and Jefferson, who bartered (and
who later regretted bartering) the location of the seat of the federal government. The
fury over Hamilton’s economic system set Republicans on the path of opposition.39
As we would suspect of someone who held the vernacular republican perspective,
Manning viewed the assumption of state debts, increased taxes, and note redemption
as an aristocratic plot to deprive the common man of his livelihood. Consistent with
his vernacular critique of the Society of Cincinnati, Manning viewed Hamilton’s
economic program as further evidence of the corruption of the elite and the ruin of
the Republic:
[the burden of the national debt] is 25 Dollors apeas for each man woman & child
to pay, & seposeing there is as many women as men & all of it assessed on the
males, makes it 50 dollers apeace, which according as taxes are leaveled in
Massachusets it would come to near two hundred dollars apeace for common or
midling farmers to pay, And this is not halfe the dammages of the funding Sistim,
for it is ondly made a pretext for al the imposed dutyes excises & land taxs that are
laid upon the people, when the real intent is to make places for numerous sets of
Officers with high saliryes & fees to colect them & is always so managed that it takes
the hole Revenue to pay the interest & seport government, & seldome doth that.40
Hamilton’s economic program was a plot by ‘‘Officers with high saliryes,’’ namely the
Federalists and Cincinnati, to deprive average citizens while making themselves rich
in the process. Manning’s vernacular republican critique clearly sides with the many
over the few. The few have plotted against the many by taking over the country’s
finances; in short, the few have corrupted the government and exposed the many to
economic ruin. The beverage taxes*/especially the one on whiskey*/would cause
economic havoc for America’s farmers and lead to another of Manning’s complaints
against the elite.
The Whiskey Rebellion
Hamilton’s tax on whiskey required that growers of grain, turned into whiskey, pay an
excise tax to federal agents and that failure to comply with said tax would result in a
fine from 50 to 500 dollars. The country was divided into districts, under the control
of the President, where federal officers collected the tax and investigated those
suspected of avoiding it. Pennsylvania Senator William Maclay voted against the tax,
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as ‘‘the most execrable System that was ever framed against the liberty of a People.’’41
Maclay believed that the excise tax was evidence of Hamilton’s British sympathies, of
a Federalist cabal, and of a dangerous disregard for public opinion:
How Abandoned is the conduct of these Men! Abuse, rail at, vilify, and traduce the
European systems of excise, As much as You will, demonstrate their Absurdity,
Villainy, and deplorable Effects on Society As much as You please.’Tis all right. They
echo every Sentence. Ours is no such thing in their Language; quite innocent and
harmless. . . . Were Eloquence personified and Reason flowed from her Tongue, her
Talents would be in vain in our Assembly; or, in any other Where business is done
in dark cabal, on the principle of interested management. The Excise bill is passed,
and a pretty business it is. . . . War and bloodshed is the most likely consequence of
all this.42
Maclay considered himself to be a ‘‘true republican.’’ He therefore risked his
reputation and re-election by arguing that Hamilton’s system was ‘‘Absurdity,
Villainy,’’ and that its passing would cause ‘‘deplorable Effects on Society.’’ However,
Hamilton was the head of a powerful ‘‘dark cabal,’’ and Maclay was powerless to
prevent what was sure to end in ‘‘War and bloodshed.’’ Maclay’s perspective, like
Manning’s, was distinctly vernacular even though he was a member of the elite ruling
class. He firmly believed in and vigilantly argued for policies that he hoped would
promote the liberty of all of the people, not merely the elite. When he found himself
powerless to stop the cabal he, again like Manning, poured out his frustrations in his
Diary. The goal of his Diary was to expose the cabal to his constituents; therefore,
Maclay’s perspective supports our general argument that vernacular republicanism
was a prevalent critical perspective, and that it was useful for those at the margins of
power. Maclay’s Diary was portentous indeed; Hamilton’s excise tax did result in
‘‘War and Bloodshed.’’
Whiskey producers tended to be outlying small farmers who found it more
profitable to distill their grain into alcohol than to pay the exorbitant costs of
shipping their grain to larger markets. These small farmers*/especially those in four
counties in western Pennsylvania*/thought that the merchants who actually sold the
whiskey should pay the taxes and they immediately petitioned Congress for a redress
of their grievances. Hamilton responded to such criticism in his March 6, 1792
REPORT of the SECRETARY of the TREASURY, respecting the ACT imposing a
DUTY on SPIRITS, & c. In it he argued that the federal government was justified in
creating the tax, that the tax was not unjustly targeted against small farmers, and that
the Fourth Amendment was not violated by the officer’s power of inspection. On May
2, 1792 Congress approved the Militia Act, which gave the President the power to call
out the state militia during emergencies, largely as a response to perceived threats
from the then docile excise tax protesters. By September 15, 1792 President
Washington issued a proclamation condemning the farmers who attempted ‘‘to
obstruct the operation of the laws of the United States for raising a revenue upon
spirits distilled within the same.’’43 The problems of the whiskey producers became
entangled with international politics and growing hostilities between the Federalists
and the Republicans when in 1793 Citizen Genet conducted his ill-fated tour of
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America, and in the process whipped democratic-republican clubs into a frenzy of
French sympathy and raised the ire of Washington and other Federalists*/even
Republican Thomas Jefferson thought that Genet had overstayed his welcome. Party
animosity between the Republicans and the Federalists increased dramatically and
Jefferson resigned from Washington’s cabinet at the end of 1793. Washington believed
that the Republicans were overtly trying to undermine and destroy the federal
government and such incidents of open rebellion as the whiskey farmers’ refusal to
pay taxes seemed to Federalists to be a part of the Republican plot.
Despite the tense political problems both internationally and nationally, for the
farmers who were plagued by mounting debt and who were forced to watch as their
neighbors were carted off to debtors’ prison while the federal government was unable
or unwilling to secure shipping rights for them on the Mississippi, the tax still seemed
unreasonable. These farmers may have felt as ‘‘Whisky’’ had in April, 1792, ‘‘I am
clear against an excise; therefore I would not submit my property to any
authority. . . . I will cry out re-publi-can-ism and the rights of man, by which I
don’t mean the laws of the land.’’44 The argument of Whisky may seem anarchical,
but it can also be read as a reasonable critique of the existing laws and as evidence of
elite republicanism. As Whisky understood the situation the law itself was
un-republican because it infringed on the rights of farmers like himself, and was
supported by a cabal of elites. Eventually, on July 15, 1794 the anger of the
beleaguered Pennsylvanian farmers of Washington, Westmoreland, Fayette, and
Allegheny counties erupted in several tar-and-featherings and the burning of excise
officers’ homes and offices. At first the Washington administration attempted to
negotiate with the insurrectionists, but when it appeared that a peaceful resolution
would not be forthcoming and that the insurrection might spread to western Virginia
and Maryland, and when a reported 7,000 people stormed Pittsburgh in protest of
the tax, the administration took direct action. The response was meant to restore
order and to show the force of the federal government*/Washington and Hamilton
would not suffer another embarrassment at the hands of the insurrectionists.
President Washington invoked the 1792 Militia Act, called up a massive force (larger
than the Revolutionary Army) of 15,000 militiamen from Pennsylvania, Maryland,
New Jersey, and Virginia, and marched them out west to quell the rebellion.
When the troops got there they met little resistance and 150 men were eventually
arrested and then given presidential pardons for their involvement. Manning was not
a whiskey producer, but he did own a tavern that sold whiskey and seemed to have
always sympathized with the common farmers, who he must have encountered on a
daily basis. With Hamilton’s funding program the perceived cause of the rebellion,
and with the Society of Cincinnati leading the charge against Manning’s common
man, he could not help himself from viewing the military suppression as yet another
blunder of the Washington administration:
the Pitsburg Insurrection would never have hapned if it had not bin for some
unreasonable iritations imposed on the people by trying to inforce the Excise Law
their before it was put in execution in other parts of the Coontinant, or if they had
known the mindes of the people on it in other parts, & after it had breok out might
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have bin settled for a trifel if fatherly & kinde measures had bin used. But as it was
maniged, it cost the Continint, upwards of twelve hundred thoughsand dollars.45
Not only were the elite self-serving, but the constant pursuit of their own self-interest
caused them to make poor decisions and to waste taxpayer money. In short, Manning
extended his vernacular republican critique of the few by arguing that their hubris
and self-interest led to the further ruin of the country. If in Manning’s eyes the federal
government’s handling of the Whiskey Rebellion was an ‘‘unreasonable iritation,’’
then John Jay’s 1796 treaty with Britain could only be viewed as a ‘‘Monster.’’
Jay’s Treaty
The Republican fury over Jay’s Treaty was complicated. First of all, this was not John
Jay’s first diplomatic mission. Rather, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and Jay were
the diplomats who negotiated the Paris Peace Treaty, which ended the Revolutionary
War on September 3, 1783 and ostensibly granted that ‘‘The navigation of the river
Mississippi, from its source to the ocean, shall forever remain free and open to the
subjects of Great Britain and the citizens of the United States.’’ In 1785 Jay was asked
to negotiate with Spanish minister Don Diego de Gardoqui over the promised right
to navigate the Mississippi. Jay was unsuccessful with Gardoqui who was under strict
orders from Spain to keep the Americans out of the Louisiana Territory, and in 1788
petitioned the Confederated Congress to revise his strict instructions about
navigation rights on the Mississippi in favor of better shipping rights for the
northeast. Southerners were none too pleased with Jay’s request, but the question
became moot as Jay was recalled due to the adoption of the new federal Constitution.
A decade later the United States still had not secured (and would not completely
secure until Jefferson’s administration made the Louisiana Purchase with Napoleon in
1803) their British-granted rights to sail the Mississippi. But more than this was at
stake in 1795 when the Senate ratified Jay’s Treaty with Britain. France had declared
war on Britain on February 1, 1793 and with Spain on March 7, 1793, and while
Spain negotiated treaties with both France and the United States in 1795, France and
Britain were still fighting and, more importantly, were trying to get the United States
to break its vow of neutrality by bringing captured merchandise into American ports,
‘‘molesting’’ American ships in the West Indies, and in other ways stirring up
domestic discord (a` la Citizen Genet’s public tour in 1793). James Monroe had been
attempting to negotiate with France in 1795 when news of Jay’s Treaty with Britain
became known, and the French became even more suspicious of America’s motives, a
suspicion that would lead to the quasi-war with France during the Adams
administration.
Jay’s instructions from Congress asked Britain to consent to: remove themselves
from their military posts on the western border of the United States; make restitution
for property (slaves) taken by Britain during the Revolution; settle the western and
northeastern boundaries of the United States; create a commercial arrangement; and
cease capturing American ships. The commercial agreement Jay negotiated was so
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bad that Americans burned him in effigy and protested his Treaty all over the
country.46 However, Washington and the Federalist-dominated Senate agreed that in
their situation a bad treaty was better than no treaty at all, and ratified. The
Republicans controlled the House of Representatives and forced a debate over
whether or not to fund the provisions of the Treaty, but eventually acquiesced.
Federalist journalist Peter Porcupine wrote against the Republican delay tactics in the
House:
What! Did these opposition members desire to see something that would reconcile
the people to the treaty! These very men who had, in ways more or less direct,
stipulated with the mob to oppose it. It is a fact well known, that the leaders among
them had all written or made public speeches representing it as inimical to the
rights and liberties of the people.47
According to Manning the Federalists were as guilty as the Republicans of mis-
representing the Treaty to the average citizens.
Manning said of the Treaty: ‘‘[W]hen the Monster came furst into vue, it was
reprobated from one end of the Continant to the other. Scarsely one dare say a single
word in favour of it.’’ But after the heated debate in the House, Manning reported:
‘‘[T]he Monster must have dyed for want of seplyes, had it not bin for the most
treasonable arts & doings of the few.’’ The few, said Manning, had sent circular letters
and petitions containing:
the most horred & frightful falsehoods that ever was invented by the Divel. In ordir
to fright the people to petition the house to grant said Seplyes, representing that the
house ware unconstitutianly with holding the seplys and trying to userp all the
powers of Government to themselves, & that unless the trety took place Britain
would sartainly make war with us, & that their power over us & Vengence upon us
would be such that they would rouse off a grate gun 3000 miles distance & blow all
our brains out if we stept out to piss.48
Despite all the threats and designs of the treasonable few, Manning blamed the
ratification of the Treaty on the common folks, who ‘‘for want of the means of
knowledge amongue the people they ware so fraited with these lyes that they hastened
to see which cold git his name to the memorial first.’’ Manning asked his friends and
neighbors why they had signed the petition, and ‘‘some would say they singed for the
treaty, some for the good of the cuntry, some to keep from war, some for Washington
& some to stand by the Constitution.’’ We can almost feel Manning’s acute anger at
the few and grief about the democratic process when he described what followed:
‘‘[W]hen I told them the true circumstances of the afair they would like lambs that
are dumb after they are sheared, turne away & wish to hear no more about it.’’49
Manning witnessed first hand the duplicity of the elite few and the shame of the
common mass as they realized their deception. Such observation compelled Manning
to solve the problems he found inherent in America’s un-republican republican
government and reaffirmed his intense hatred of the few who would so easily
manipulate the many. We believe that this is the moment when Manning decided to
craft the Key as a statement of protest against the ‘‘lyes’’ of the few. We believe further
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that he felt duty bound to expose the machinations of the elite cabal in hopes of
restoring republicanism to the masses.
The question then arises: If the interests of the few and the many are so distinct,
why do the many acquiesce? This was the most rhetorically difficult question for our
advocate to answer, as it has been for all social critics ever since. As sociologist James
C. Scott poses the question in Weapons of the Weak , an important recent critique of
hegemony and false consciousness theory: ‘‘Why . . . do people seem to knuckle under
when they appear to have other options?’’50 In answering this question, Manning
provided a catalogue of what Russell Hanson calls, following Habermas, conditions of
‘‘systematically distorted communication’’ in the early republic.51
According to Manning there are eight ways in which the few rule. First, they keep
the many ignorant. Although one normally would think this a characteristic of a
monarchy, it also arises in republics after a successful revolution. Since a successful
revolution requires leadership; there is a natural tendency for the common people to
‘‘reverance & respect such men,’’ and the result is that ‘‘they go on old ways & neglect
to search & see for themselves & take care of their own interists.’’ Manning deplored
the inability of the average voter to get a clear ‘‘knowledge of the carictor, abilityes &
politicle sentiments of those they vote for,’’ and the resulting low voter turnout that
allowed the few to decide elections. Second, the few organize and ‘‘join in their secret
corraspondance to counter act the interest of the many & pick their pockets.’’ Here
Manning gives us a list of the occupations of the few: Marchents, Phitisians,
Ministers, Lawyers, Letirary Men & the over grown rich.’’ All of them share the secret
of forming associations. Third, the few advance their own ‘‘Larning,’’ through ‘‘costly
collages, national acadimyes & grammar schooles,’’ yet oppose ‘‘cheep schools &
woman schools’’ for the many. Fourth, the few make newspapers expensive and
biased against the interests of the many. Here again our labourer defends the liberty
of the press as ‘‘the gratest & best means of obtaining the knowledge nesecary for a
free man to have.’’ He condemns the few for raising the price of newspapers and for
using ‘‘all the arts & retrick hell can invent to blackgard the Republican printers & all
they print.’’ Fifth, the few make laws ‘‘numerous, intricate & as inexplicit as possible.’’
This increases the number of lawyers and executive officers. Sixth, the few manage
money to the injury of the many, controlling banks and the money supply. Seventh,
the few engage in flattery, bribery, and threats in order to influence elections: ‘‘I will
wager a ginna that you dare not vote for such a man*/if you do you shall have a
bloody nose for it.’’ Finally, the few encourage wars in order to justify the raising and
keeping of standing armies ‘‘to deprive their own subjects of their Rights &
Libbertyes.’’52
Generally, what we might today refer to as an elite ‘‘hegemony’’ was constructed, in
Manning’s eyes, by complex, lawyerly language and by blockages in the free flow of
information among the citizenry. The Jay Treaty, for example, illustrated how the
‘‘inexpliset’’ character of the Constitution makes it difficult to implement clearly.
Supporters of the treaty relied on the fact that it was so complex that ‘‘but few of the
common peopel could comprehend it,’’ and that the relative prosperity of the times
made the legislatures less vigilant than they should have been. The few also, under the
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lead of ‘‘the adultrious Hambleton,’’ trumped up the Whiskey Rebellion as an excuse
for a show of military power. The net result would be war with France, which
Republicans in general believed ‘‘seems to have bin the design of our Administration
ever since the treaty was in contemplation.’’53 Manning concluded this section with
an analysis of the French Revolution and the efforts of the few to undermine it, and
saw the few as extending their power to the whole world: ‘‘Gog & Magog are gathered
together, to destroy the Rights of Man & banish Libberty from the world.’’54
Next, Manning turned to his solution to the problem of corruption. This section
seems comically tame compared to the inflammatory language of the rest of his
treatise. Once you have identified your opponents as Gog & Magog it would be more
logical to take up arms against them than to create a society and a magazine for the
dissemination of political information. Yet this is precisely Manning’s solution, which
leads to the conclusion that Manning was so enraptured by his belief in vernacular
republicanism that he believed that mere vigilance by the many could cure the ills of
the few’s cabal.
The Reamidy
The final section of the Key is a brief discussion of Manning’s proposed plan for
political reform. It rests on the principle that ‘‘if elections are closely attended to by all
the peopel & they look well ever after their Representatives, their is no dainger but
that they will do their duty. Therefore the ondly remidi is knowledge.’’ Manning then
provided a list of the knowledge necessary to participate effectively as a citizen. The
list is not unlike the knowledge already imparted to a reader of the Key : ‘‘a knowledge
of Mankind,’’ ‘‘of the differend interest that influence all ordirs of men,’’ ‘‘a knowledge
of the prinsaples of the government & Constitution he lives under,’’ and so on. He
concludes by describing how the society might work. A paid librarian would keep the
magazine for a whole neighborhood to read. The magazine could be printed and
distributed for about nine shillings, or $1.50 per year (compared with the estimated
cost of a newspaper of three or four dollars a year). If members would put in $25 to a
fund, the interest could fund the magazine permanently, without the trouble of
collecting annual payments. In fact, if the state or national government would fund
the magazine it would still cost less than either the Shays’ Rebellion or the Whiskey
Rebellion, which could have been prevented by the existence of the magazine. He
even proposed that such a magazine and society established throughout the world
would prevent wars.55
The author concludes with a return to the theme of his introduction, ‘‘my frinds I
have tryed to describe to you (not in the language & stile of the Larned for I am not
able) But in as plane a manner as I am capable, the Causes that have always destroyed
free governments,’’ and the remedy. He places his draft constitution at the end so that
the reader will put the remedy
immediately on foot & neaver give over untill such a Society is established on such
a strong & lasting foundation that the gates of hell can never prevail against it*/
which may the Almighty grant is the sincear desire of A LABOURER.56
134 J. R. Mercieca & J. A. Aune
After discussing his constitution, the Key concludes with a covenant to be signed by
all members in which they promise to support the society, but most importantly to
take pains to informe ourselves into the true prinsaples carictor & abilityes of all
those we vote for into any office in the Government we live under, & that we will
attend on all elections when we can & put in a vote for those persones we think will
serve the publick the best. (254)
We have no information about how Manning reacted to the election of 1800, but it
is not difficult to imagine that he would have viewed it as a victory for his more
vernacular form of republicanism, in contrast to the elitist republicanism of the
Federalists, even if the few remained in control. By the end of the 1790s, as Alan
Taylor writes, elections had come to serve two contradictory purposes: ‘‘to determine
the proper gentlemen fit to rule and to preserve the Republic from aristocratic
plots.’’57 Eventually the Republicans ‘‘triumphed by persuading the majority that
professed friendship for the people was the proper and fundamental basis for
authority. . . . Elections almost invariably turned on who could best depict the
opposition as crypto-aristocrats out to corrupt the Republic.’’58 The Republicans won
by reviving ‘‘the old populist rhetoric of an ongoing class struggle between common
producers (farmers and artisans) and parasitic Federalist aristocrats.’’59 If Republicans
exploited vernacular republican rhetoric it is nonetheless useful to examine the Key of
Libberty as a sort of index of the mentalite´ of those common producers for whom the
populist rhetoric was persuasive. This vernacular republican rhetoric included not
only a set of characterizations of American class structure, it also included an implicit
view of rhetoric and language.60 In the final section of this essay, we pursue the
theoretical implications of Manning’s vernacular republican rhetoric.
Vernacular Republicanism
As we argued at the outset of this essay, William Manning’s Key of Libberty embodies
a different form of republicanism to the elite republicanism previously studied by
rhetorical scholars. Four prominent features characterize vernacular republicanism:
(1) the aggressive use of a rhetoric of critique; (2) the belief that public debate
should be transparent and open to all opinions; (3) the rejection of elite leadership;
and (4) the belief that liberty, freedom, and republicanism exist for the common
good, not just for the benefit of the few. It must be noted that vernacular
republicanism prima facie seems to have much in common with elite republicanism.
However, while elite republicanism made pretensions to each of these four
republican characteristics, vernacular republicanism earnestly demands immediate
action to rectify the discrepancy between the promise of republicanism that serves the
interests of the many and the reality of republicanism that serves the interests of the
few. In other words, elite republicanism is characterized by its satisfaction with
the status quo, while vernacular republicanism extends the locus of critique to
all forms of oppression, whether the oppression is based upon economic, class,
power, or (eventually) race and gender injustices. The overarching logic of vernacular
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republicanism is a critique of argumentum ad verecundiam , a critique of argument by
authority. The promise of the American Revolution, according to the vernacular
republican perspective, was to create a government that derived its just powers ‘‘from
the consent of the governed’’; a government in which the people were to be the
foundation of power; and a government that existed to effect the ‘‘safety and
happiness’’ of the people. Simply, vernacular republicanism argues that the proper
authorities are not in power and seeks reform. We will briefly discuss these four
features of vernacular republicanism before returning to the differences between elite
and vernacular republicanisms. We conclude by arguing that vernacular republican-
ism is not restricted to William Manning’s Key of Libberty, or to early American
republican rhetoric, but that the logic of vernacular republicanism is the cornerstone
of American reform rhetoric.
Rhetoric of Critique
The Key of Libberty is first and foremost an exercise in political criticism. Manning’s
survey of the Thucydidean crises of the 1790s is a steamrolling account of the
mistakes made by the leaders of the newly formed United States of America. While
Manning’s goal is also to unite his fellow laborers and to empower them to educate
themselves, these goals are desirable because they will help more people to critique
the government. In other words, part of the goal of Manning’s criticism is to
encourage more skeptical criticism of the few. The Key demonstrates to its readers
that criticism is healthy for the Republic because it functions as a check on the power
elite. Further, good republican citizens were duty bound to protect the Republic from
corruption, and thus duty bound to scrutinize those in power very carefully. The first
lesson to be learned from William Manning’s vernacular republicanism is that citizens
are supposed actively and vigilantly to act as a ‘‘watchdog’’ over the government.
Transparency and Openness
Throughout the Key Manning argued that the language of the elite was purposely
dense so that the many would not be able to comprehend political controversies; such
opaque language also prevented the many from entering into public debates. The Key
functioned as a cure to these maneuvers by the few by first demonstrating that
anyone, even Manning, could with but a little bit of diligence find out what the few
were doing and speak of their opinions to the public. Manning hoped that some
‘‘larned Republican’’ would correct his spelling, but he otherwise was remarkably self-
confident about addressing an audience of the whole republic. It was, as Gordon S.
Wood writes, this lack of deference that was the truly radical result of the American
Revolution.61 Transparency and openness were key to Manning’s vernacular
republicanism because the many could not exercise their fair share of political power
or actively critique the few if they could not comprehend or enter into the public
debates. The second lesson to be learned from William Manning’s vernacular
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republicanism is that corruption reins supreme when elites use ‘‘rhetrickery’’ and
access to the public sphere is limited.
Rejection of Elite Leadership
Manning’s whole argument hinged on exposing the elite’s appeal to misplaced
authority: he argued throughout the Key that the few have claimed the authority to
rule the many, but that these few have stumbled and blundered from one disaster to
the next. His discussions of the Society of Cincinnati, Hamilton’s funding system,
the Whiskey Rebellion, and Jay’s Treaty proved that the few had no right to be in
charge because they were corrupt, made mistakes, and did not act in the interest of
the whole. In other words, the few had not embodied republican virtue, which
means that they lacked the legitimacy necessary to rule the Republic. While the
Revolution had been fought so that the people would rule, the many had granted
the few too much power and the few had abused the trust of the many. The Key
therefore explicitly rejects the leadership of the few and urges the many to take a
more active part in political affairs. The third lesson to be learned from William
Manning’s vernacular republicanism is that the few will always seek and abuse
power.
Common Good
The final noteworthy feature of the Key is its demand that the weighing mechanism
for political decisions*/whether made by the few or the many*/should be the
common good. While elite republicans had often placated the masses with empty talk
about the common good, Manning demonstrates that the few considered their own
interests above the common interest at every opportunity*/from the Society of
Cincinnati to Jay’s Treaty. The culmination of his critical perspective, his mandates
for transparency and openness, and his critique of the legitimacy of elite power, was
to argue that in sum total the United States of America has constantly made decisions
based on the interests of the few, rather than the interests of the many. His solution
was for the many to recognize that they form a distinct interest and wrest the balance
of power back from the few; ostensibly this would allow the many to make decisions
in the interest of the common good. The fourth lesson to be learned from William
Manning’s vernacular republicanism is that when political decisions are not made in
the interest of the common good, the many will suffer.
Elite and vernacular republicanisms
Robert Hariman’s groundbreaking Political Style devotes a chapter to the republican
political style. A political style generally consists of a combination of rhetorical
designs, philosophical arguments, and institutional practices. The republican style
itself is
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particularly imbued with a set of ideas about human nature and good government.
This conception of political life celebrates self-government as the highest moral
calling, insists that citizens’ political activities should be motivated and guided by
civic virtues, and cautions against the influences of private, especially commercial,
interests.62
Republics, by their very nature, are always at risk of devolving into anarchy or empire.
In order to protect the fragile republic, institutions such as the legislature, public
practices such as eloquent oratory, and heroic public figures such as George
Washington must work together to cultivate the citizenry’s moral sense. The type of
communication valued by republicans is decorous, oratorical, and elitist. Hariman
writes that ‘‘the republican hierarchy is distinguished by both its elevation of oratory
and its broad valuation of all other forms of verbal artistry.’’63 Hariman thus describes
the republican style as the realm of elite discourse, or ‘‘artistry,’’ over plain speech.
However, as the Key demonstrates, American republicanism also contains a more
populist, even democratic, strand of political theory and an attendant rhetorical style.
The vernacular republican style privileges plain speech over trickery (not necessarily
eloquence) because everyone can use and understand plain speech. In this sense,
rhetoric functions as the medium of the political process*/nothing more or less.
If we were constructing a rhetorically artful author of the Key we might conclude
that he is enacting for the reader a kind of republican civic education, and his
rhetorical style, bad spelling and all, has the effect of showing the reader: ‘‘Hey, if I
can do it, you can do it, too.’’ This perspective would mirror Stephen Browne’s
analysis of Thomas Jefferson’s first inaugural address. Browne persuasively argues that
Jefferson’s particular felicity of expression was a portrayal and an embodiment of his
republican faith, that his ‘‘call to nationhood’’ was a ‘‘conspicuous display of its
author’s style and thought.’’64 Jefferson’s detached eloquence stands in stark contrast
to Manning’s emotional diatribe, yet both are rhetorical embodiments of each
author’s republicanism. Vernacular republicanism is not only premised on the notion
that the many should hold power, but also that every person’s opinion has value.
Vernacular republicans believe that whether or not opinions are presented with
refinement and eloquence they are still worthy of being heard in public discussions.
Manning and other 18th-century republicans agreed on the value of self-government,
the fragile nature of republics, and the threat to civic virtue posed by commercial and
other special interests. Where Manning differs, however, is in his rejection of
decorous oratory as a privileged mode of public communication and in his rejection
of ‘‘top-down’’ republican oratory in favor of information circulating freely among
the citizenry and public leaders. The themes of critique of power, transparency and
openness, and the common good are distinctive of Manning’s vernacular repub-
licanism.
The themes represented in William Manning’s Key of Libberty are quite familiar to
students of American political discourse, which is why we believe that vernacular
republicanism must be considered equal to elite republicanism. At a normative level,
we would argue that many of the same forces that made Manning take up his pen
continue to limit popular civic participation in the United States and that the rhetoric
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of vernacular republicanism remains prominent in critiques of power. The
displacement of political questions by legal questions, the cult of secrecy in high
government circles, and the concentration of political power in Washington today are
eerily similar to Manning’s criticism of the 1790s. We suspect that when rhetorical
scholars take another look at the rhetoric of the women’s movement, the civil rights
movement, and other critiques of existing power structures, they will find that the
vernacular republican perspective has lingered in the American repertoire. For
example, Berkeley Free Speech Movement leader Mario Savio spoke on December 2,
1964 to students sitting-in at Sproul Hall. His speech exhibits all of the markers of
vernacular republicanism: he critiques the U. C. Berkeley power elite, calls for more
transparency and openness, and asks for decisions to be made for the common good.
‘‘Last summer I went to Mississippi to join the struggle there for civil rights,’’ Savio
began. ‘‘This fall I am engaged in another phase of the same struggle,’’ he continued,
this time in Berkeley. The two battlefields may seem quite different to some
observers, but this is not the case. The same rights are at stake in both places*/the
right to participate as citizens in democratic society and the right to due process of
law. Further, it is a struggle against the same enemy. In Mississippi an autocratic
and powerful minority rules, through organized violence, to suppress the vast,
virtually powerless majority. In California, the privileged minority manipulates the
university bureaucracy to suppress the students’ political expression. That
‘‘respectable’’ bureaucracy masks the financial plutocrats; that impersonal bureau-
cracy is the efficient enemy in a ‘‘Brave New World.’’65
So 166 years after Manning wrote the Key Mario Savio argued for similar positions,
using similar premises, which tells us that the vernacular republican perspective has
endured as a prominent feature of American political discourse. After 200 years we
still find that the language of critique embodied in vernacular republicanism is
prevalent today. We find that it is still the duty of average citizens to act as watchdogs
and to speak truth to power; that corruption still reins supreme when elites use
‘‘rhetrickery’’ and access to the public sphere is limited; that the few will still always
seek and abuse power; and that when political decisions are not made in the interest
of the common good, then the many will still suffer. Neither the right nor the left has
a coherent program for improving civic education, local politics, or the transmission
of information to the public. Vernacular republicanism, for these reasons, deserves
renewed attention from scholars and activists. That farmer and tavern-keeper
William Manning, in the depths of a Massachusetts winter, expressed his discontent
with elite rule is part of his small, but enduring, contribution to the American
‘‘democratic imagination.’’
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